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5.1  Introduction 
During the last decade, Latin America has made substantial progress on the 
fiscal front. After a prolonged period of growing government and lack of com- 
mitment to fiscal discipline, which resulted in high stocks of  debt and high 
inflation during the second half of the 1980s, expenditures and deficits were 
significantly reduced. Although the improvement in the fiscal accounts was 
widespread throughout the region, there is still a great deal of variety across 
countries with regard to fiscal performance. For the 1990s, public sector defi- 
cits in countries in the region have ranged from more than 10 percent of GDP 
in Guyana and Suriname, to a surplus of  2.2 percent in Jamaica. The differ- 
ences also remain very important in terms of expenditure levels and stocks of 
public debt. 
A less well known characteristic,  which distinguishes  countries in Latin 
America from the industrialized countries, is the highly procyclical response 
of fiscal policy: in general, public expenditures increase and tax rates decline 
during expansions, and the opposite happens during recessions.  Unlike the 
progress made in other aspects of fiscal performance, the procyclicality of  fis- 
cal policy is still a lingering problem in the region, as the recent experiences 
of Argentina and Mexico illustrate. Both countries had to engineer very large 
fiscal adjustments in the midst of the severe recessions that followed the Mexi- 
can devaluation of  December 1994. While management of  fiscal policy over 
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the business cycle has been procyclical in every country in the region, as in the 
case of deficits and expenditures, there are also significant differences across 
countries in this regard. 
The great variety of fiscal experiences among fairly homogeneous groups 
of countries is not unique to Latin America. Within the OECD countries, for 
example, debt ratios currently range from less than 40 percent to more than 
120 percent of GDP. Total deficits vary from close to zero, to more than  10 
percent of  GDP. Purely economic factors seem insufficient to explain these 
very large differences in fiscal outcomes across countries. For this reason, sev- 
eral recent  studies have explored  whether political-institutional  factors may 
contribute to explain these cross-country differences in fiscal performance. 
One strand of this literature has emphasized the importance of political vari- 
ables such as the type of government (whether single-party majority, coalition, 
or minority), the durability of government, and the polarization of the political 
system on fiscal performance. The evidence, drawn mostly from OECD coun- 
tries, is generally supportive of the idea that differences in political variables 
can explain differences in fiscal performance,  although the specific political 
variables that are relevant vary across different studies.' 
A second strand of this literature emphasizes the role of budgetary institu- 
tions on fiscal outcomes. As with the political variables, until recently this liter- 
ature had focused on the OECD countries. Von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen 
and Harden (1995) find that budget institutions have a significant impact on 
debt ratios and on deficits in the countries of the European Union. In turn, 
Eichengreen (1992), Alt and Lowry (1994), and Poterba (1994), among others, 
have studied the effects of fiscal restraints on fiscal outcomes for the case of 
the U.S. states, reaching qualitatively similar conclusions. Alesina, Hausmann, 
Hommes, and Stein (1996) have recently extended this line of research to de- 
veloping countries. They find evidence that, in Latin America, budgetary insti- 
tutions have had an important effect on primary deficits. Similar findings are 
reported by Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (chap. 6 in this volume), in their 
study of Argentine provinces. 
This paper explores the links between institutional arrangements and fiscal 
performance in  Latin America. We  consider four measures of performance, 
namely, the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, 
and the degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy in response to business fluctu- 
ations; and two institutional dimensions, namely, electoral systems and budget- 
ary procedures. 
The next section presents  a stylized description  of  fiscal performance in 
Latin America. Section 5.3 describes the main characteristics of electoral sys- 
tems in Latin America and evaluates the impact of  electoral institutions on 
political outcomes. We find that systems that rely on proportional representa- 
tion, as opposed to plurality  systems, tend to generate a greater number of 
1. See, for example, Roubini and Sachs 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Roubini 
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effective political parties and  less congressional support for the governing 
party. Section 5.4 describes the main characteristics of budgetary procedures 
in Latin America and presents an index of budgetary institutions, based on 
Alesina et al. 1996, that is subsequently used in the empirical analysis. Section 
5.5  evaluates the impact of institutional arrangements on fiscal performance. 
We  find that countries with a large district magnitude and a large number of 
effective parties tend to have larger governments and larger deficits and to re- 
spond more procyclically to the business cycle. We also find that budget proce- 
dures that include constraints on the deficit, introduce hierarchical elements 
into the budget process, and are more transparent lead to lower deficits and 
lower debt. By hierarchical procedures we mean those that tend to concentrate 
more power in the finance minister, vis-8-vis other ministers, and in the execu- 
tive vis-8-vis the legislature. Finally, we explore the interactions between elec- 
toral systems and budgetary institutions. In contrast to the findings of Haller- 
berg and von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume) for the European countries, we 
do not find evidence that strong budgetary institutions can neutralize the poten- 
tially  adverse fiscal  consequences of  proportional representation on  fiscal 
deficits and debt. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2  The Fiscal Performance Variables:  Evidence from Latin America 
This section briefly describes the stylized facts on fiscal performance in 
Latin America in four different dimensions: the size of the public sector, the 
size of fiscal deficits and public debt, and the business cycle response of fiscal 
policy. When appropriate we also report industrial country information on fis- 
cal performance for the purpose of comparison. Rather than relying on readily 
available central government data, we work in most performance dimensions 
with data corresponding to the consolidated public sector, which includes the 
central government, the social security system, public enterprises, and local 
governments. We think this comprehensive definition of  government is more 
appropriate for the present study. Central government data would, for example, 
underestimate the size of highly decentralized governments such as Argentina, 
Brazil, and Colombia, where nearly half of all expenditures are carried out by 
state and local governments. Given the lack of coverage of existing sources of 
public-sector data, we constructed a data set for 1990-95, based on the Recent 
Economic Development reports of the IMF, for 26 countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, those which are members of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank.2 
5.2.1 
In contrast to the OECD countries, where the size of government has grown 
dramatically and uninterruptedly in the last 35 years from an average of 26.6 
The Size of the Public Sector in Latin America 
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percent of GPD in 1960 to 49 percent of GPD in 1995, its evolution has been 
uneven  in  Latin America.  Latin  American  governments  grew  very rapidly 
through the seventies and early eighties, collapsed in the late eighties in the 
aftermath of the debt crisis, and have remained fairly stable since the beginning 
of the nineties. The average size of government-as  measured by the expendi- 
tures of  the consolidated public sector-stands  today at 28 percent of GDP, 
slightly over half the size of their OECD counterparts. 
Except for notable exceptions, such as Japan and the United States, which 
have significantly smaller governments than the rest of the OECD countries, 
and Sweden and Denmark, which have significantly larger governments, the 
dispersion  among OECD countries is relatively  small. In contrast,  in Latin 
America there are wide differences across countries in government size, rang- 
ing from 12 percent of GDP in Guatemala and Haiti to numbers in excess of 
40 percent of GDP in Belize, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Suriname. The average 
government expenditure of the consolidated public sector for each country in 
1990-95  is presented in table 5.1. The second column in the table (G’) presents 
a measure of government expenditure that excludes social security and inter- 
est payments. 
The observed disparity in government size within Latin America and be- 
tween Latin America and the OECD countries is related in part to the level of 
income per capita. The size of government in the lowest income quartile in 
Latin America averages 20 percent of GDP, compared to 30 percent of GDP in 
the highest and 48 percent of GDP in the OECD countries. In other words, 
richer countries tend to have larger  government^.^ 
5.2.2  Fiscal Deficits and Public Debt 
With a few exceptions, standard measures of public debt do not suggest 
that Latin American governments are highly indebted when compared to the 
industrial countries. The median of  public debt as a percentage of GDP is in 
fact lower in Latin America (55  percent) than in the OECD (65 per~ent).~  How- 
ever, the debt-to-GDP ratio is not necessarily the most adequate metric to mea- 
sure the extent of  countries’ indebtedness. The ratio of public debt to total 
revenues of the public sector might be a better indicator. In fact, the ratings of 
Latin American bonds are highly correlated with the debt-to-revenues ratio: 
the Baa-rated countries had at the end of  1996 a debt level equivalent to 1.2 
years of revenues, while the B-rated countries had a debt level equivalent to 
2.1 years of  revenue^.^ Measured by this standard, Latin America is still highly 
3.  As we shall see later, in addition to income per capita, the degree of openness of an economy 
to international trade, the degree of indebtedness, and the age distribution of the population are 
other important determinants of the  size of government. 
4.  We report here the median rather than the average due to the existence of outliers in Latin 
America, such as Nicaragua and Guyana, two small countries that are very highly indebted. For the 
OECD  countries, the median and the mean are virtually the same. The average for Latin American 
countries is reported in table 5.1. 
5. The same association can he found in the case of  subnational governments in the United 





























































































































































































































Sources: G, G', surplus, primary surplus, and debt: own calculations based on the recent economic developments, IMF. Procyclicality: Talvi and Vegh  1996. 
Note:  G is the total expenditures of the consolidated public sector in proportion of GDP. G' excludes social security expenditures and interest payments. Government surplus is measured by 
the surplus of the consolidated public sector in proportion of GDP. Primary surplus is total surplus minus interest payments. Government debt is measured by the total debt of the consolidated 
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indebted. Public debt represents 2.25 years of  revenues for the typical Latin 
American country and only 1.5 years for the OECD countries, where debt lev- 
els have grown substantially in recent years. 
These regional generalizations hide a wide variety of situations within Latin 
America. Table 5.1 shows the debt-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-revenues ratio 
for Latin American countries. Debt levels as a percentage of GDP vary from a 
low of less than 25 percent of GDP in the Bahamas, Paraguay, Guatemala, and 
Chile, to nearly five and seven times GDP in the cases of Guyana and Nicara- 
gua. Several countries, such as Honduras, Panama, and Jamaica, have debt ra- 
tios of around 100 percent of GDP. 
The ordering of debt levels as an indicator of past fiscal behavior should be 
interpreted with caution. Past accumulation of debt may be an imperfect mea- 
sure of  past fiscal behavior in Latin America, since in high-inflation countries 
it may underestimate the extent to which lack of fiscal discipline was pervasive 
in the past. Many countries in the region implicitly defaulted on their debt 
obligations through repeated episodes of  surprise devaluations and inflation 
that significantly reduced the real value of  nominal debt commitments. The 
tendency to resolve the fiscal problems generated by  persistent deficits and 
debt accumulation through traumatic adjustments in the exchange rate and the 
price level may distort the ordering of countries when the stock of debt is used 
to assess the extent of lack of fiscal discipline. 
In recent years, Latin America has undergone a substantial fiscal consolida- 
tion. The average fiscal deficit of  the region has declined from 9 percent of 
GDP in the early 1980s to less than 2.6 percent of GDP in the 1990s. Further- 
more, the number of countries that have fiscal deficits under 3 percent of GDP 
is currently 16, compared to only 4 in the early eighties. 
Differences across Latin American countries are also substantial with re- 
spect to deficits: in the first half of the 1990s the deficit of  the consolidated 
public sector was greater than 5 percent of GDP in Belize, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and reached double digits in Guyana and Suriname, 
while Jamaica, Paraguay, Barbados, and Chile had surpluses in excess of  1.5 
percent of GDP. 
5.2.3 
The business cycle response of  fiscal policy in Latin America has been at 
odds with both the established theory and the experience of  industrial coun- 
tries. According to standard Keynesian prescriptions, the government should 
either increase spending or reduce tax rates during recessions in order to stim- 
ulate  aggregate demand and partially prevent the economy from underem- 
ploying resources for prolonged periods of time. During expansions the gov- 
ernment must do the opposite in order to “cool off” the economy and contain 
inflationary pressures. 
According to the neoclassical tradition (see, for example, Barro 1979 and 
Lucas and Stokey 1983), spending programs and tax rates should be set on 
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the basis of long-run considerations and should not respond to business cycle 
movements of the economy; that is, fiscal policy should not be used for de- 
mand management purposes. During expansions, when both economic activity 
and tax revenues are high, the budget surplus should improve and debt should 
be retired, while during recessions, when both economic activity and tax col- 
lection are low, the budget  surplus  should decline and any resulting deficit 
should be financed by issuing debt. Put differently, the stock of debt should act 
as a buffer to prevent inefficient changes in either government spending pro- 
grams or tax rates. 
What does the evidence show? While fiscal policy in industrial countries 
appears to be broadly consistent with the neoclassical prescriptions, in Latin 
American countries, government spending and tax rates are highly procyclical; 
that is, government spending increases and tax rates fall during expansions and 
the opposite occurs during recessions. The behavior of fiscal policy in Mexico 
and Argentina in the aftermath of the December 1994 Mexican crisis is a recent 
and clear illustration of the procyclical nature of fiscal policy in Latin America: 
in spite of tumbling into very steep recessions in 1995 both countries imple- 
mented equally severe fiscal adjustments that resulted in spending cuts and 
increases in tax rates6 
Table 5.1 presents evidence on the business cycle properties of government 
consumption in Latin America, which we use as an measure of procyclicality 
of fiscal policy. We measure these cyclical properties as the correlation be- 
tween the cyclical component of  government consumption and the cyclical 
component of output, for the period 1970-95.’ In contrast to the G-7 countries, 
where government consumption is not correlated with output over the cycle, it 
is highly procyclical in Latin America: the average correlation is .52 (see Talvi 
and Vegh 1996). 
For the region as a whole, the behavior of fiscal policy is puzzling, both in 
terms of the existing body of theory and when compared to the G-7 countries. 
Naturally, there are important disparities in the degree of procyclicality of the 
countries in the region. While Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, the Dominican 
Republic, and Ecuador display a relatively low degree of procyclicality, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela display a very high degree of procyclicality 
with correlation coefficients in excess of  .8. In contrast to the G-7 countries, 
however, no single country in Latin America exhibits a negative correlation 
between government consumption and output. 
Talvi and Vegh (1 996) have suggested a possible explanation for this puzzle. 
The procyclical fiscal behavior may be an optimal response of the government, 
given the difficulty of saving fiscal resources during booms, due to the political 
pressures to increase public spending that occur in times of plenty. The fact 
6. For recent evidence on the procyclicality of  fiscal policy in Latin America see Gavin et al. 
7. This measure of procyclicality is the same one used in Talvi and Vegh 1996. 
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that procyclicality is not observed in OECD countries is a result of the lower 
volatility of the tax base. In this case, political pressures to spend will be rela- 
tively unimportant, as budget surpluses, even during good times, do not deviate 
much from their average levels. 
In summary, there is a wide diversity within Latin America in the four di- 
mensions of  fiscal performance we have reviewed.  In the next sections we 
exploit this diversity to assess the role of institutional arrangements, that is, 
electoral systems and budgetary processes, in accounting for the observed dif- 
ferences in fiscal performance. 
5.3  The Institutional Variables: Electoral Systems 
A large body of  economic research has tested the empirical relevance of 
political variables on fiscal performance. Most of the literature concentrates on 
the impact of political variables on fiscal deficits and debt accumulation as 
measures of performance. Roubini and Sachs (1989), working with a sample 
of industrial countries, find evidence that countries characterized by govern- 
ments with short average tenures and by the presence of many political parties 
in the ruling coalition tend to have larger deficits, particularly during periods 
of macroeconomic stress, when fiscal adjustments are necessary. A reexamina- 
tion of Roubini and Sachs (1989) by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) finds that it is 
minority governments rather than majority coalition governments that affect 
budget deficits. Roubini (1991), using a sample of developing countries, finds 
that an index of political instability, measured by the frequency of government 
changes, appears to lead to larger deficits. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 
(1991) test the impact on debt accumulation of three political characteristics: 
the type of government, that is, single-party majority, coalition, or minority; 
the durability of government; and an indicator of polarization as measured by 
significant changes in government. They find that lack of  fiscal discipline is 
almost exclusively limited to proportional-representation systems and that the 
one feature that appears to be responsible is the shorter duration of govern- 
ments. Alesina and Perotti (1995) analyze the anatomy of fiscal adjustments in 
the OECD and find that permanent improvements are mainly implemented via 
cuts in expenditures, while temporary improvements are carried out almost 
exclusively via tax increases. They also find that coalition governments often 
try to make substantial fiscal adjustments, but they are much less likely to carry 
out the expenditure cuts that make an adjustment successful. 
Many of the political characteristics explored by the literature are, in a more 
fundamental sense, shaped by the electoral system, that is, the set of rules un- 
der which members of parliament and the executive are elected in a representa- 
tive democracy. We therefore start this section by characterizing electoral sys- 
tems in Latin American countries and then explore the links between those 
electoral systems and political outcomes. 
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electoral-system experts that the two most important dimensions of  an elec- 
toral system are the electoral formula and the district magnitude (see Lijphart 
1994). There are three main types of electoral formulas: first-past-the-post, or 
plurality, systems (where only one representative is elected per district and all 
seats go to the winner); proportional-representation systems (where the seats 
are distributed in proportion to the votes obtained according to some allocation 
rule); and mixed systems, which combine features of both. 
The polar characterization of proportional-representation (PR) and plurality 
systems (PL) is less clear-cut in practice. Some PR systems have few seats to 
be allocated per district and hence cannot achieve much proportionality in the 
representation. District magnitude (DM) simply measures the average number 
of representatives elected per district. Plurality systems can then be redefined 
as those that have a district magnitude of  1, while systems become more pro- 
portional as the DM increases. Hence, district magnitude is a more continuous 
representation of the electoral systems contained between the two polar cases 
of pure PL or PR. 
Lijphart (1994) presents evidence for the industrial countries that indicates 
that proportional-representation systems with large district magnitude, that is, 
where the number of representatives elected per district is large, tend to en- 
courage multiparty political systems and coalition or minority governments. 
By contrast, first-past-the-post systems tend to produce two-party systems, ma- 
jority governments, and a higher degree of disproportionality, that is, a larger 
deviation between the parties’ shares of the seats in relation to their share of 
the votes. Furthermore, proportional-representation systems tend to have gov- 
ernments with shorter tenures than  single-party majority  governments (see 
Roubini and Sachs 1989 and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991). 
The previous evidence implies that other things being equal, PL or low-DM 
systems are likely to have governments with stronger support in the legislature 
and therefore are likely to be more decisive. Furthermore, they are likely to 
have more stable governments, that is, governments with longer tenures. To the 
extent that these arrangements generate two-party systems, there is likely to be 
a competition to capture the political center, and hence it is also likely that 
parties will be less ideologically polarized. However, these three characteristics 
come at the cost of a higher degree of disproportionality of the political system. 
By  contrast, high-DM systems are more likely to produce weaker govern- 
ments, because with a larger number of parties it is harder to ensure control of 
the legislature. Furthermore, coalition governments tend to have a shorter dura- 
tion because, after all, they are formed by competing parties.8  Finally, the in- 
creased number of parties might make the center a less attractive political strat- 
egy  and hence may  deliver wider ideological distances between the likely 
winners of  an election. In summary, the strength or weakness of the govern- 
8. For evidence on electoral systems and the durability of  governments see, for example, Rou- 
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ment, the durability of government, and the polarization of the political system 
are all potential channels through which the electoral system can impact fis- 
cal performance. 
Next we describe the characteristics of electoral systems in Latin America. 
We then show that electoral systems are instrumental in shaping political out- 
comes such as the number of  parties represented in the legislature and the 
likelihood that the executive enjoys a majority in the legislature or will have to 
form coalitions or govern with weak support in the legislature. In section 5.5, 
we present evidence that electoral systems have a meaningful impact on fiscal 
performance. 
5.3.1  Electoral Systems in Latin America 
Latin America has a large variety of  electoral systems. However, propor- 
tional representation (PR) is by  far the most common system: 15 out the 26 
countries that form our sample have  proportional-representation systems, 6 
(the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
have first-past-the-post or plurality systems (PL), and 5 (Chile, Mexico, Pan- 
ama, Peru, and Venezuela) have mixed systems (M) that combine features of 
both PR and PL in different ways (see table 5.2). For example, in Mexico and 
Venezuela some candidates for the lower house are elected under the PL sys- 
tem, while others are elected using the PR system. In Panama, legislators are 
elected by  PL or PR depending on the electoral circuit in which they run. In 
Chile and Peru, candidates are presented in lists, but voters can cast a preferen- 
tial vote for one of the candidates and the candidates with the largest number 
of preferential votes are selected within the list. 
Seventeen countries have two-tier or bicameral systems, while nine coun- 
tries have only one-tier or unicameral systems. Unicameral systems are pre- 
dominantly observed in countries with PR  systems, while all PL systems are 
bicameral. The basic rationale for two-tier systems is to combine the advan- 
tages of  a close voter-representative contact characteristic of  smaller districts 
with the advantages of greater proportionality and minority representation of- 
fered by larger districts (see Lijphart 1994). 
District size, the average number of representatives elected per district, var- 
ies considerably across countries. PL systems have district sizes that are small 
in absolute value (less than 2) and smaller in every case than any PR  or M 
system. Among PR or M systems district size for the lower house varies from 
2 in Chile and 3.2 in Ecuador to more than 10 in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, 
and Brazil. The variety in district size is even greater in the upper house, rang- 
ing from 2 in Chile to 102 in Colombia, where the whole country constitutes 
a single district. 
Past colonial links appear to be important determinants of electoral systems 
in Latin America. English- or French-speaking countries-with  the exception 
of Guyana-have  PL systems, low district magnitude, low effective number of 
parties, and, in general, majority governments. The rest of the countries have- 
whether they speak in Spanish, Portuguese, or Dutch-PR  or M systems. Table 5.2  Electoral Institutions and Political Outcomes 
Electoral lnstitutions  Electoral Outcomes 
Legislative  Executive 
Lower/ 
Single  Higher  Presidential 
Legislative  Number of  House  House  Average  vs. 
Electoral  Legislative  District  District  District  Parliamentary  Number  of 
Country  Formulas  Chambers  Magnitude  Magnitude  Magnitude  Systems  Rounds 
Legislative  Executive 
% of Legislative 
Seats Held 
Absolute  Effective  by Head of 
Number of  Number of  Government's 
Parties in  Parties in  Party in Lower/ 































































































































































































































































































Sources: Constitutional and legal texts, own calculations based on data by Wilfred Derksen. 
Now District magnitude is the average number of representatives elected per district. Average district magnitude is the weighted average (weighted by the  number of representatives in each house) of the 
district magnitude of the lower and upper houses. The number of  effective parties, Ns. is defined as Ns = I/E< where s, is the proportion of representatives party i has in the lower house. 
'In  Peru after the constitutional reform of  1993, there is only one electoral dismct and the congress has a single house. Only one election has been held under the new rules 114  Ernesto Stein, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti 
Another important dimension of  the electoral systems has to do with the 
way in which the executive is chosen. In presidential democracies the president 
is voted directly and has significant independent authority. By contrast, in par- 
liamentary democracies the prime minister is accountable to the legislature. 
The manner in which the chief executive is chosen may have important conse- 
quences. On the one hand since only large parties have a realistic chance of 
winning the presidency and this advantage is likely to carry over to legislative 
elections, we expect, other things being equal, that presidential systems will 
have a smaller effective number of parties than nonpresidential systems of gov- 
ernment. On the other hand, an independently elected chief executive might 
undermine party discipline: when the control of the presidency does not de- 
pend on parliamentary majorities, parties can afford greater internal di~sent.~ 
In Europe, most countries have parliamentary democracies. The opposite is 
true in Latin America: 20 out of 26 countries are presidential democracies, and 
only 6 are parliamentary. All PL systems are parliamentary democracies (ex- 
cept Haiti),  and all PR and M systems are presidential democracies  (except 
Suriname). 
The other dimension concerning the election of the executive in presidential 
democracies is whether there is only one round or two rounds of voting to elect 
the president. When there are two rounds of  voting, unless a candidate wins 
the absolute majority in the first round, a second round is held. Of the 20 presi- 
dential democracies in Latin America, half have one round of  voting to elect 
the president, the other half have two. 
5.3.2  Electoral Systems and Political Outcomes 
Proportional-representation systems with large constituencies, that is, where 
the number of representatives elected per district is large, allow a more exact 
mapping between  the votes obtained by a party  and the representation  that 
party obtains in the legislature. A simple example may serve to illustrate the 
latter point. Consider an election in which the three main parties get 45 per- 
cent, 40 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. A first-past-the-post system, that 
is, a system that elects one representative per district with the winner taking all 
the seats, may create a very large majority. In fact, if the vote is homogeneously 
distributed throughout the country, the first party would win all congressional 
races and seats. A system of proportional representation that elects few repre- 
sentatives per district, for example two, would only allow the first two parties 
to obtain representation in the legislature, precluding the minority party with 
10 percent of the vote from obtaining representation. By contrast, in a system 
of proportional representation where the number of representatives elected per 
district is large, for example 100, the smaller party will obtain 10 seats in the 
legislature. In fact, the two smaller parties may even be able to form a coalition 
and control the parliament. 
9. See Rogowski 1987. Person, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) argue that the lack of legislative 
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Proportional representation systems therefore allow a broader representation 
of the electorate. However, the inclusiveness of the PR system comes at a cost: 
the same electoral rules that allow a higher degree of proportionality are those 
that create the incentives for the system to produce a large number of parties. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship between the district magnitude, which 
measures the average number of representatives elected per district for 26 Latin 
American countries, and the number of effective parties that are represented in 
the legi~lature.'~  The difference between the absolute number of parties in the 
legislature and the effective number is that the latter weights each party by its 
share of the vote in the legislature. For example, if there are two parties repre- 
sented in the legislature, one with 90 percent of the seats and the other with 10 
percent, the effective number of parties will be 1.2 rather than 2. Only when 
the parties have an equal share of the seats in the legislature will the absolute 
and effective number of parties be the same." 
Electoral systems, by discouraging or encouraging the existence of a limited 
number or a large number of parties, affect the likelihood of having a single- 
party majority, a coalition, or a minority government. Figure 5.1 shows that in 
Latin America the percentage of the seats that the government enjoys in the 
legislature is very closely connected to the number of effective parties repre- 
sented in parliament: the larger the number, the more likely it is that the gov- 
ernment will have weak support in the legislature. The correlation coefficient 
between these two variables is .79. 
There is another important dimension, concerning the election of the execu- 
tive in presidential democracies, that may be relevant in determining the num- 
ber of effective parties: whether there are one or two rounds of voting to elect 
the president. The two-round process, known as ballotage, is likely to encour- 
age several parties to run in the first round and form electoral coalitions for 
the second round. As a result, the number of effective parliamentary parties is 
expected to be larger, other things being equal, with two rounds of voting than 
with one. There is some evidence of this effect in Latin America. The absolute 
number of parties is on average 10.5 in countries with two rounds of  voting 
and 7 in countries with one. The corresponding figures for the effective number 
of parties are 3.7 and 3,  respectively. 
After discussing the role of budget institutions in the next section, in section 
5.5 we will assess the importance of  our two institutional dimensions on fis- 
cal performance. 
5.4  The Institutional Variables: Budgetary Institutions 
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a growing body of literature 
that links differences across economic units in fiscal performance to the nature 
10. In two-tier systems the district magnitude for each country is the maximum between the 
11, For details on the index that measures the number of  effective parties see Lijphart 1994. 
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of their budget institutions. Until recently, this literature concentrated mainly 
on the experience of industrial countries. For example, von Hagen (1992) and 
von Hagen and Harden  (1 995) developed  a comprehensive  index of  budget 
institutions for the countries in the European Union and found that these insti- 
tutions have a significant impact on debt ratios and on deficits. Several authors, 
in turn, have studied the effects of fiscal restraints on fiscal outcomes for the 
case of the U.S. states, exploiting the differences across states regarding the 
stringency of their balanced-budget rules. Eichengreen (1992) finds that fiscal 
restraints have a significant and negative effect on deficits, as well as on state 
bond  yields. Alt and Lowry (1994) find that states with stringent balanced- 
budget rules react more strongly to previous-year deficits. Qualitatively similar 
results are found by Poterba (1994), who also studied within-year adjustments 
to fiscal shocks.12 
More recently, Alesina et al. (1996) have extended this line of  research to 
the developing world: using data obtained through a survey of budgetary insti- 
tutions in 20 Latin American countries, they find evidence that these institu- 
tions have an important effect on primary deficits.I3 In the present paper, we 
will use the budget institutions database created by these authors, but expand 
the focus to include not only effects on primary deficits, but on all the variables 
of fiscal performance described in section 5.2. 
Following Alesina and Perotti (chap. 1 in this volume), we define budgetary 
institutions as the set of rules, procedures,  and practices according to which 
budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. 
The government budget is the result of a collective decision-making process 
that involves a variety of  agents from the executive and legislative branches 
of government: the finance minister, spending ministers, and members of the 
legislature.  A  very  important characteristic  of  government  programs  is that 
they tend to generate benefits  that are concentrated  either geographically  or 
sectorally. These programs, however, are typically financed from a common 
pool of  resources. As a result of  this  asymmetry, those who benefit  from a 
government program will fail to internalize the full cost of the program, since 
an important portion of the cost is borne by others. This externality inherent to 
the budget  leads to a problem of overutilization of  the common pool of re- 
sources, which the literature refers to as the commons problem. The fact that 
most of the agents involved in the budget negotiations represent either sectoral 
or geographical interests introduces spending and deficit biases into the pro- 
cess, which can compromise the achievement of fiscal discipline. 
Legislators, for example, will push for programs that benefit their geograph- 
ical constituencies, but are financed by the national taxpayer. Weingast, Shep- 
sle, and Johnsen (1981) have studied this commons problem at the level of the 
12. See also von Hagen 1991; Bohn and Inman 1995; and Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1994. For 
13. Similar findings are reported by Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (chap. 6 in this volume), 
an excellent survey of  this literature, see Poterba 1996. 
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legislature, showing that it can lead to excessive spending, as legislators fail to 
internalize the full cost of these programs. Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume) 
and von Hagen and Harden (1995) studied the commons problem within the 
cabinet. Spending ministers, who are subject to the pressures of sectoral inter- 
est groups, favor increases in programs for their departments, financed out of 
national resources. In a dynamic setting, this leads to excessive deficits and 
debt accumulation. This behavior of  spending ministers is reinforced by  the 
fact that their power within the government is usually perceived to be associ- 
ated with the size of  the budget they manage. In  contrast to the rest of  the 
participants in the budgetary process, finance ministers usually face the entire 
budget constraint. Moreover, since they have  the ultimate responsibility for 
macroeconomic policy, they have better incentives to promote fiscal discipline. 
Budget institutions matter because they can affect the “rules of the game” 
under which these agents interact, either by placing constraints on the whole 
budgetary process, or by distributing power and responsibilities among the dif- 
ferent players, in ways that can affect outcomes in one direction or the other. 
If  adequately designed, budgetary institutions can play a critical role in coun- 
terbalancing the spending and deficit bias that may  otherwise prevail due to 
the incentives of some of the agents involved in the budgetary process.I4 
Budgetary institutions can be usefully divided into three different catego- 
ries. The  first  are rules  that  impose numerical  constraints  on  the  deficit. 
Balanced-budget rules, such as the one recently considered and defeated in 
the U.S. Congress, are the best-known example of  numerical constraints. As 
discussed above, evidence from the 50 U.S. states suggests that  balanced- 
budget rules have significant effects on the size of the budget, on deficits, and 
on the reaction to fiscal shocks. However, these rules are, in general, very in- 
flexible and do not allow for tax-smoothing policies. In addition, balanced- 
budget rules, as well as other numerical rules such as the Maastricht criteria 
for the European Union, may  generate incentives for creative accounting in 
order to circumvent them, and can result in a less transparent process.’s 
Constraints on the deficit can take other forms. In most countries, govern- 
ments prepare macroeconomic programs that  include fiscal, monetary, and 
balance-of-payments targets consistent with expectations regarding key vari- 
ables in the economy, such as the rate of growth and inflation. An alternative 
way  to impose a constraint on the deficit is to require that the budget sent by 
the executive for discussion in the legislation be consistent with targets set in 
a previously approved macroeconomic program. Such a requirement may pro- 
vide discipline to the budgetary process if the macroeconomic program clearly 
identifies limits on the size of the budget and its balance compatible with the 
achievement of other economic goals. Other possible constraints on the size of 
14. For an in-depth discussion of the theoretical issues underlying the importance of budget 
institutions see von Hagen 1992 and Alesina and Perotti 1995. 
15. This point has been made by Alesina and Perotti (1995). 119  Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance 
the deficit are ceilings on government borrowing, usually set by  the legislature 
before budget discussions. Some authors have proposed that borrowing ceil- 
ings be imposed by  an independent agency, created specifically for this pur- 
pose.I6 
The second type of rules are procedural rules that govern the drafting of the 
budget by  the executive, its discussion in the legislature, and its execution. 
While numerical rules impose constraints on all the agents involved in the 
budgetary process, procedural rules determine the way in which these agents 
interact, shifting the balance of power among the different agents in favor of 
one or the other. According to the procedural rules that organize the budgetary 
process, we can distinguish between more “hierarchical” and more “collegial” 
institutional arrangements. At the drafting stage, hierarchical rules are those 
that give considerable power to the finance minister in budget negotiations 
within the executive, limiting the prerogatives of the spending ministers. At the 
approval stage, hierarchical rules are those that set restrictions on the power of 
the legislature to modify the budget proposed by the executive, in particular 
with respect to the size of the budget and the deficit. At the execution stage, 
hierarchical rules are those that limit the initiative of the legislature to propose 
increases in the size of the budget once it has been approved. In contrast, colle- 
gial institutions provide a greater balance of power between the spending min- 
isters and the finance minister during the drafting stage, and between the exec- 
utive and the legislature during the approval and execution stages. 
The third type of  procedures and practices are those associated with the 
transparency of the budgetary process, that is, the extent to which the budget 
document provides an accurate representation of projected expenditures, reve- 
nues, and deficits. One issue regarding transparency is that the players involved 
do not always have an incentive to be truthful. If the government wants to hide 
a deficit, it might have incentives to overestimate the growth rate of the econ- 
omy. On the other hand, a fiscally conservative finance minister might want 
to hide resources from the spending ministers and the legislature. Spending 
ministers, in turn, might want to misrepresent the composition of their budgets, 
knowing that the chances of  obtaining more resources after the budget is ap- 
proved are better for some items (such as their wage bill) than for others. Other 
issues of  transparency include the existence of  extrabudgetary items, hidden 
liabilities, and contingent liabilities, such as those derived from implicit or 
explicit guarantees by the central government to state and local governments, 
public enterprises, and the banking sector. 
Alesina et al. (1996) used information collected through a survey to build 
an index of budgetary institutions for Latin America. The survey, which was 
responded to by  budget directors from 20 countries in the region, provided 
16. Von Hagen and Harden (1995) suggested the creation of  such an agency, which they called 
the National Debt Board, for the European Union. Eichengreen,  Hausmann, and von Hagen (1996) 
have made a proposal along similar lines, which they called the National Fiscal Council, specially 
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information on the extent to which budget institutions in the different countries 
impose numerical constraints on the deficit, have hierarchical rules in the dif- 
ferent stages of the budgetary process, and transparent budgetary practices. 
In this paper, we use an index of budget institutions based on the same sur- 
vey, which is similar to the original one except for one factor: since our fiscal 
performance database covers the period  1990-95,  we have adapted the index 
so that it represents, for each country, the nature of budgetary institutions for 
the same time period. This introduces some changes, as a number of countries 
have reformed some aspects of their budgetary institutions in recent years. The 
value of the index of budgetary institutions for each country is represented in 
figure 5.2.’? 
This index will be used in section 5.5 to assess the impact of budget institu- 
tions on aggregate fiscal performance. 
5.4.1  The Question of Endogeneity 
An important consideration regarding the effects of  budget institutions on 
fiscal performance variables is related to potential endogeneity of the budget 
institutions variables. Alesina and Perotti (chap. 1 in this volume) discuss two 
, 0.50 
0.47 
0.45  j 
17. For a detailed description of  the construction of the index, as well as information on the 
budget institutions of  each country, see Alesina et al. 1996 and Hausmann and Stein 1996. 121  Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance 
possible sources of endogeneity. First, budget institutions could be endogenous 
to past fiscal performance, that is, could be reformed as a result of poor past 
performance. Second, both the choice of budget institutions and the fiscal per- 
formance could in fact be explained by a third variable, which is omitted from 
the analysis. 
Although Alesina and Perotti recognize that budget institutions are to a cer- 
tain extent endogenous to past fiscal performance, these authors argue that, at 
least in the short run, it is reasonable to consider them as exogenous. The argu- 
ment relies on the fact that institutional reform is costly, and therefore fiscal 
outcomes have to be very unsatisfactory before these reforms take place, which 
results in a strong status quo bias of these institutions. 
A few countries in our sample have had reforms of their budget institutions, 
as measured by changes in our index, since 1980. Although our data set does 
not allow us to study the important issue of endogeneity in a systematic way, 
these changes can shed some light on the determinants of institutional reform. 
Out of the 20 countries in the sample there are only 2 that have implemented 
what we consider to be major budget reform, defined as changes of 0.15 or 
more in the value of our index, during this 15-year period. These two countries 
are Argentina and Peru. 
In Argentina, changes in the budget process began in 1991, but were formal- 
ized by the Law of Financial Administration in 1992. Among the most impor- 
tant changes, the budget was made more inclusive, substantially reducing the 
importance of off-budget items; the macroeconomic program became a more 
important reference for the elaboration of  the budget by  the executive, and 
changes were made to the process of elaboration, through which the different 
ministries were given quantitative spending limits at the beginning of the pro- 
cess rather than just qualitative orientations, as was the case until then; during 
the approval stage, the legislature was restricted from proposing amendments 
that would increase the deficit; and the autonomy of state-owned enterprises to 
borrow was curtailed. Perhaps more importantly, for the first time since 1953, 
the budget of the year 1992 was presented and approved within the constitu- 
tionally set time frame, before the beginning of  the year,  a practice that has 
continued every year since then (see Makon 1995). 
In Peru, reform occurred in 1990, in the early stages of President Fujimori’s 
term. In this case, changes included elevating the status of the finance ministers 
over that of the spending ministers on budgetary matters, requiring consistency 
between the budget presented to the legislature and the macroeconomic pro- 
gram, and limiting the prerogatives of the legislature in proposing amendments 
to the budget that increase either the deficit or spending. In both countries, 
budget reform was not an isolated event, but rather part of wide-ranging reform 
packages implemented, particularly in the case of Argentina, by  strong fi- 
nance ministers. 
Although these countries had important fiscal deficits during the late 1980s, 
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What sets Argentina and Peru apart during this period is the fact that they both 
suffered severe hyperinflations, which reached three-digit (monthly) levels.  Is 
The experience of Argentina and Peru provide support for the argument of 
Alesina and Perotti: institutions are costly to change, and tend to change in 
significant ways only when performance is very unsatisfactory. The fact that in 
Argentina the budget was not presented and approved in time for almost 40 
straight years suggests that these institutions do have a strong status quo bias, 
even when they are not written into law. 
An interesting case is that of Costa Rica, where reform of the budget institu- 
tions is currently under consideration. The proposed reform includes strength- 
ening the authority of the finance minister and increasing the role for the mac- 
roeconomic program and the coverage of the budget. The cornerstone of  the 
proposed reform, however, is a constitutional amendment that would require 
that public sector deficits not exceed 1 percent of GDP.I9  The main goal of the 
reform (and particularly of this constitutional amendment) is to put an end to 
the electoral budget cycle, a problem that is quite common in Latin America, 
but has become particularly serious in Costa Rica. In 1994, the last electoral 
year, the fiscal deficit reached 7 percent of GDP. The legislature began discus- 
sion of the reform in 1995, but the process of approval has not been completed 
yet, and approval is not expected before the 1998 elections. In the meantime, 
Costa Rica is experiencing the increase in public wages typical of the period 
leading to elections. Costa Rica, then, represents another example of the diffi- 
culty of reforming the budgetary institutions, at least in the short run. 
The long-term evolution of the budget institutions in Colombia, studied by 
Hommes (1996), also offers examples of the permanence of budgetary rules. 
For example, the Constitution of 1886, which laid out the basis for the budget 
process, established that the government could increase expenditures during 
periods when the legislature was not in session, provided these increases were 
judged to be “unavoidable.” As a result, the government would typically wait 
for the end of the sessions to increase expenditures, reducing the transparency 
of the budget. Similarly, a 1916 law established the priority of earmarked ex- 
penditures, reducing the flexibility of the budget. It was only with the Constitu- 
tion of  1991 that these two rules were eliminated. 
Throughout his paper, Hommes discusses the determinants of institutional 
reform in Colombia. While in a few cases reform followed a severe crisis (for 
example, in 1892), in most cases budget reform was simply implemented by 
18. The other two countries that experienced  very high inflation in the late  1980s and early 
1990s were Brazil and Nicaragua. Brazil did not reform its budget institutions. We have no data 
on budget institutions in Nicaragua. However, the new  government implemented a stabilization 
program, trade liberalization, and tax reform in 1991, which makes it likely that the budgetary 
process was reformed as well. 
19. For an account of  the political cycle in  Costa Rica, and details on the proposed reform, 
see Rodriguez  1995. Currently, there are no countries in  Latin America that have this type of 
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a reformist official motivated by  good management principles, and in some 
cases, imposed from outside the country.2o 
Regarding  the  second  potential  source of  endogeneity, the  question  is 
whether it is the institutions that are having an effect, or whether these institu- 
tions simply reflect society’s aversion to fiscal indiscipline, and it is these pref- 
erences of society and not the institutions themselves that are responsible for 
the differences across countries in fiscal performance. The argument that insti- 
tutions are endogenous to the preference of voters is, of  course, a plausible 
one. However, it is not clear that this has been the case in Argentina and Peru. 
In fact, Menem won his presidency by running a populist campaign, and only 
after being elected did he shift toward the implementation of market-oriented 
reforms, surprising both those who had voted for him and those who had not. 
In  the case of Peru, Fujimori did not have  an economic program during his 
campaign and ended up implementing the program of his electoral opponent, 
Vargas Llosa. 
Other possible determinants of institutions are the preferences of particular 
interest groups, and the difficulty or ease with which these groups can exert 
pressure on policymakers. Posen (1995) has pointed out the importance of in- 
terest groups in the context of  the literature on central bank independence, 
arguing that it is the preferences of the financial sector and the influence that 
this sector has on policymakers that matter for inflation, rather than the statu- 
tory independence of the central bank per se. Posen admits, however, that the 
time span under consideration is important in establishing whether institutions 
matter. While preferences and political forces determine outcomes in the long 
run, over short periods of time institutions may in fact mattet2* 
Even though we recognize the existence of potential sources of endogeneity, 
in this paper we treat budgetary institutions as exogenous. Given the time pe- 
riod under consideration, 1990-95,  we do not think that the assumption of exo- 
geneity is a serious shortcoming of this study. 
5.5  Electoral Systems, Budget Institutions, and Fiscal Performance 
In the previous sections we described fiscal performance in Latin America 
and the two institutional dimensions this paper is concerned with, namely, elec- 
toral systems and budgetary processes. We  now proceed with the empirical 
analysis in order to evaluate whether these institutional dimensions are sig- 
nificant in explaining cross-sectional differences in fiscal performance in Latin 
America. In doing so, we face the problem of working with a small sample, 
which is sometimes reflected in lower levels of significance. We  first analyze 
20. This author reports that in 1923 Colombia was seeking foreign loans to finance public invest- 
ment, and that “the foreign bankers pressed for reforms such as the creation of a central bank, 
adherence to the gold standard, and adoption of  ‘modem’ budget procedures” (Hommes 1996,9). 
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the impact of electoral systems and budgetary processes on fiscal performance 
individually, and then explore the interactions between the two sets of institu- 
tions. 
5.5.1  Electoral Systems and Fiscal Performance 
In the empirical analysis we consider three attributes of the political system: 
the district magnitude, which is our main characterization of the electoral sys- 
tem, and two outcomes of the system, namely, the number of effective parties 
and the support of the governing party in the legislature. District magnitude 
enters the regressions in logs, as we believe its effects should be nonlinear. 
Table  5.3 presents the regression results for government size. In  the first 
three columns, the dependent variable is public sector expenditures (G).  In 
columns 4 through 6, it is a measure of public expenditures that excludes social 
security and interest payments (GI).  The reason for using this last measure is 
that it is often argued, at least for the OECD countries, that a large part of the 
explanation for cross-country differences in the size of government is given by 
the size of the social security sector. 
As control variables, we used the level of debt at the beginning of the period, 
the degree of openness of the economy (measured as imports plus exports over 
GDP), and the proportion of the population above 65 years of age. Initial public 
debt is expected to have positive effects on total public expenditures through 
its effect on interest payments. It is not expected to have effects on G', so it 
was not included in  regressions 4 through 6. Openness is expected to have 
positive effects on the size of government, following recent findings by Rodrik 
(1996).22  The age variable is expected to have positive effects as well, only in 
the government size measure that includes social security expenditures (G). 
All controls had the expected sign and were significant in most regressions. 
Following our discussion in section 5.3, we  expect district magnitude and 
the number of effective parties to have positive effects on government size, and 
the proportion of legislative seats held by  the government to have a negative 
effect on size. Table  5.3 shows that, in every case, political variables enter 
with the correct sign, although the levels of significance are not always high, a 
consequence in part of the small sample size. For total government expenditure 
G,  only the number of effective parties is significant.  The estimated coefficient 
indicates that the impact of electoral institutions on government size is poten- 
tially large in economic terms: a country with a number of effective parties 
equal to four is expected to have a public sector 4 percentage points of GDP 
larger than one where the effective number of parties is two. For the case of 
G',  the number of effective parties is significant at the 10 percent level, while 
22. Rodrik (1996)  argues that the explanation for this empirical regularity is that open econo- 
mies are exposed to significant external risk, and that a large government sector reduces the expo- 
sure to this risk. Table 5.3  Electoral Institutions and Government Size (cross-section regressions, average 1990-95) 
Government Size 
G  G’ 
Institutional Arrangements  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
District magnitude  0.0109  0.0135 
(0.0143)  (0.0121) 
Number of effective parties  0.0204  0.0177 
Number of legislative seats  -0.0967  -0.1521 
(0.0107)  (0.0101) 
(0.1271)  (0.1005) 
Controls 
Constant  0.1189  0.0412  0.1776  0.1199  0.0736  0.2160 
Debt at 1989  0.0147  0.0160  0.0154 
Openness  0.1163  0.1494  0.1217  0.1172  0.1406  0.1257 
Population over 65  years  1.1655  1.3718  1.2786 
(0.0582)  (0.0705)  (0.0709)  (0.0392)  (0.05  17)  (0.0523) 
(0.0080)  (0.0071)  (0.0078) 
(0.0488)  (0.0492)  (0.0510)  (0.0413)  (0.0432)  (0.0412) 
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Sources:  G, G’ and debt: own calculations based on the recent economic developments, IMF.  Effective number of  parties and number of  legislative seats: own 
calculations based on data by Wilfred Derksen. District magnitude: constitutional and legal texts. Openness and population over 65 years: World Bank indicators, 1995. 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. G is the total expenditures  of the consolidated public sector in proportion of  GDP. G’ excludes social security 
expenditures and interest payments. District magnitude is the logarithm of the average number of representatives elected per district. Number of effective parties is 
the number of political parties weighed by its share of the vote in the legislature. Number of legislative seats is the proportion of the seats that the executive enjoys in 
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the proportion of seats held by the government is significant at the 15 percent 
Table 5.4 shows the effects of two of our political variables on public-sector 
surplus and on primary surplus.24  In the case of primary surplus, we controlled 
for the initial level of debt. In columns 2 and 4, we restricted the sample to the 
20 countries for which we have data on budget institutions, in order to be able 
to discuss later the effects of including both institutional dimensions together. 
The coefficients of all the political variables have the expected sign. District 
magnitude is marginally significant for surplus, while the number of legislative 
seats is significant for the primary surplus. Note that when the sample is re- 
stricted, district magnitude becomes a significant determinant of primary sur- 
plus, and the number of legislative  seats becomes significant for the surplus 
as well.25 
The coefficient for DM suggests that, here again, economic effects are im- 
portant: a country with a PL system is expected to have budget surpluses 1.1 
percent of GDP larger than countries with a PR system and a district magnitude 
of 3.  The same difference in surplus should be expected between two countries 
with PR systems with DM of 3 and 9.26  We also performed regressions for both 
of our debt measures, but we failed to find any significant relationship between 
any of the political variables and debt levels. We will discuss later how the ef- 
fects of our political variables change once we account for the effects of budget 
institutions. 
Table 5.5 presents the results for procyclicality, where volatility, defined as 
the standard deviation of real GDP growth for the period 1970-95,  is used as 
a control variable. Following the arguments of Talvi and Vegh (1996), volatility 
is expected to have a positive effect on procyclicality. 
The only political variable that was significant (at the 15 percent level) was 
district magnitude, which enters with a positive sign. The coefficient suggests 
that our measure of procyclicality is expected to be 0.08 higher in a country 
with a DM of 3 compared to a country with DM of 1  .27 
How can we interpret this result? One possible interpretation would be re- 
23. When European countries are included in the empirical analysis in order to increase the 
sample size, the qualitative results do not change, but the precision of  our estimates increases 
significantly. District magnitude, for example, becomes significant at the 10 percent level for total 
expenditures, and at the 5 percent level for G'. 
Similar results were obtained when GDP per capita was used as a control instead of the age 
variable. These two variables are highly correlated, and GDP per capita lost significance when 
included in the regressions together with the age variable. In contrast, this last variable remained 
significant. 
24. We excluded the effective number of parties to save space. This variable had the expected 
sign in all cases, but was never a significant determinant of the surplus. 
25. The countries that are excluded from the sample in columns 2 and 4 are Barbados, Belize, 
Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Suriname. Together, these six countries represent less than 1 percent 
of Latin America's GDP. 
26. Since [log(3) -  log(l)]*0.0103 = [log(9) -  log(3)]*0.0103 = 1.099*0.0103 = 0.0113. 
27. More precisely, the difference between these countries will be [log(3) -  log(l)]*O.O71 = 
0.077. Table 5.4 
Institutional Arrangements  (1)  (2)”  (3)  (4Y  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Institutional Arrangements and Government Surpluses (cross-section regressions, average 1990-95) 
Constant 
District magnitude 















-0.0085  -0.0036  -0.0466 
(0.0134)  (0.0093)  (0.0282) 
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Sources: Surplus, primary surplus, and debt: own calculations based on the recent economic developments, IMF. Effective number of parties and number of legislative seats: own calculations based on 
data by Wilfred Derksen. District magnitude: constitutional and legal texts. Openness and population over 65 years: World Bank  indicators, 1995. Index of budgetruy institutions: Alesina et al. 1996. 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. Government surplus is measured by  the surplus of the consolidated public sector in proportion of GDP. Primary surplus is total surplus minus interest 
payments. District magnitude is the logarithm of the average number of  representatives elected per district. Number of effective pmies is the number of political parties weighed by its share of the vote in 
the legislature. Number of legislative seats is the proportion of the seats that the executive enjoys in the legislature. 
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Table 5.5  Institutional Arrangements  and Procyclicality 
(cross-section regressions) 

















Sources: Procyclicality and volatility: own calculations based on the international financial statis- 
tics, IMF. District magnitude: constitutional and legal texts. 
Note: Procyclicality is measured by the correlation coefficient between the cyclical component of 
government consumption and the cyclical component of output over the period 1970-95.  District 
magnitude is the logarithm of the average number of representatives elected per district. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
lated to the arguments in Talvi and Vegh  1996. As discussed above, these au- 
thors link the procyclical fiscal behavior of Latin American governments to a 
political distortion: the difficulty of saving during booms, given the spending 
pressures that would occur if  governments were running large surpluses. As 
these authors suggest, and our results confirm, the impact of the political dis- 
tortion is larger the larger the degree of volatility faced by the country But the 
political distortion itself may depend on the electoral system in place. An elec- 
toral system that tends to produce stronger governments (such as the PL sys- 
tem, or a PR system with low district magnitude) can place these governments 
in a better position to resist the spending pressures. Although we do not want 
to push this argument too far, our district magnitude result does suggest that 
this might in fact be the case.28 
In summary, although the results are not always strong in every performance 
dimension, the evidence suggests that electoral institutions are a significant 
determinant of  fiscal performance in Latin America. Countries with a large 
district magnitude, a large number of effective parties represented in the legis- 
lature, and weak support for the governing party in the legislature tend to be 
28. We did not find a significant effect of the proportion of legislative seats held by the govern- 
ment on procyclicality, which may appear to be a better indicator of  the strength of government. 
However, we must note that this variable corresponds to the current composition of  the legislature 
and may not reflect adequately the strength of government during the 25-year  period for which we 
have measured procyclicality. In  contrast, district magnitudes,  which are characteristics of  the 
electoral institutions, rather than the outcome of elections, tend to be much more stable over time 
and may  he a better representation of the strength of  governments throughout the period. This 
problem is less important in the case of the other performance variables, since the time period 
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Table 5.6  Institutional Arrangements and Government Debt (cross-section 
regressions, average 1990-95) 
Institutional Arrangements  Debt/GDP  Debmevenues 
Constant  0.8302  5.8564 
(0.4334)  (1.8469) 
Budget Institutions  -0.4750  -5.8919 
(0.7302)  (3.11  18) 
R2  -0.03  0.12 
N  20  20 
df  18  18 
Sources: Government debt: own calculations based on the recent economic developments, Ih4E 
Index of budgetary institutions: Alesina et al. 1996. 
Note: Government debt is measured by the total debt of the consolidated public sector in propor- 
tion of GDP and in proportion of government revenues. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
associated with higher levels of government expenditures, larger fiscal deficits, 
and a more procyclical response to the business cycle. 
5.5.2  Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance 
As discussed in section 5.4, more transparent and hierarchical budgetary in- 
stitutions, that is, institutions that promote a more comprehensive view of the 
costs and benefits of government activities, should result in a higher degree of 
fiscal discipline. Therefore we expect countries that have a high index of budg- 
etary institutions (IBI) to display relatively smaller levels of  spending, fiscal 
deficits, and public debt. However, the direction of  the impact of  budgetary 
institutions on procyclicality is unclear: while more hierarchical procedures 
may improve the ability of the government to resist spending pressures during 
booms, constraints that enhance credibility in the commitment to fiscal disci- 
pline may hamper the ability of the authorities to react in an efficient manner 
to 
We find that countries with a high IBI tend to have lower deficits and lower 
debt levels than countries with a low IBI. The deficit result is presented in table 
5.4, column 5. The coefficient for budget institutions is significant at the 5 
percent level for the case of overall surplus, and at the 1 percent level for the 
case of primary surplus. The debt regressions appear in table 5.6. The IBI is a 
significant determinant of  debt levels when these are measured in proportion 
to their revenues, which, as discussed in section 5.2, is our preferred measure 
of debt. Figure 5.3 illustrates the association between the IBI and overall sur- 
plus, and between IBI and debt. 
From a quantitative point of  view the statistical relationship suggests that 
29. For example, a period-by-period balanced-budget rule would preclude the authorities from 
running a budget deficit during recessions and would therefore make it unnecessary to run sur- 
pluses during expansions, resulting in a procyclical fiscal response. A 
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the impact of budget institutions is large in economic terms. A country with an 
IBI of 0.45 is expected to have an average overall budget surplus 2.5 percent- 
age points of GDP smaller, and a primary surplus 4 percentage points of GDP 
smaller, than that of a country with an index of 0.65.30  A country with an IBI 
of 0.45 is also expected to have a debt-to-revenue ratio 1.2 years lower than a 
country with an IBI of 0.65. We did not find any significant impact of the IBI 
on government size and the degree of pro~yclicality.~' 
5.5.3  Electoral Institutions, Budget Institutions, and Fiscal Performance 
The previous results offer very interesting possibilities for exploring the in- 
teractions between electoral systems and budgetary arrangements. We  do this 
for the surplus and the primary surplus, the only dimensions of performance 
where both electoral institutions and budget institutions appear to be signifi- 
cant. Is it the case that countries with a high IBI governing the fiscal decision- 
making process can generate sound fiscal behavior whatever the electoral ar- 
rangements governing the political process? In Latin America, the  answer 
appears to be negative. 
In table 5.4, columns 6 and 7 present the results of  the regressions where 
the effect of both institutional dimensions is considered together. The relevant 
comparisons are with the restricted sample regressions, in columns 2 and 4, 
respectively. When the overall budget surplus is used as a measure of  fiscal 
performance, and IBI is included in the regressions, district magnitude gains 
some significance, while the number of  legislative seats loses significance. 
When the primary surplus is used as the fiscal performance variable, the coef- 
ficient for DM remains unchanged, but the level of significance increases. In 
turn, the coefficient for the number of  legislative seats drops slightly, but it 
remains significant at the 5 percent level. In sum, both political variables are 
significant determinants of primary surpluses when IBI is included in the re- 
gression. These results appear to contrast with those obtained by  Hallerberg 
and von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume) for European countries, who find that 
the existence of  some form of  centralization in the budget process, whether 
provided by  a strong finance minister or by  negotiated budget targets within 
the cabinet, rather than the electoral system, is the crucial determinant of fis- 
cal performance. 
5.6  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analyzed, for a sample of Latin American countries, the im- 
pact of two institutional arrangements, namely, electoral systems and budget- 
30. The quantitative impact is even stronger if the primary budget surplus rather than the overall 
budget surplus is used to perform these calculations. 
3 1. The empirical literature on budget institutions and fiscal performance has consistently found 
an impact of budget institutions on fiscal deficits and debt, but almost as consistently has failed to 
find an association with government size. This chapter is not an  exception. 132  Ernesto Stein, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti 
ary procedures, on four measures of  fiscal performance, namely, the size of 
government, the size of budget deficits and public debt, and the degree of pro- 
cyclicality in the response of fiscal policy to business cycle fluctuations. We 
find evidence that electoral systems characterized by a large degree of propor- 
tionality, that is, a large district magnitude,  and by  large degree of  political 
fragmentation,  tend to have larger governments, larger deficits, and a more 
procyclical response to the business cycle. We also find that more transparent 
and hierarchical budgetary procedures lead to lower deficits and debt. The ef- 
fects of our institutional variables tend to be large in economic terms. Contrary 
to the findings of Hallerberg and von Hagen for European countries, we find 
no evidence that centralized budgetary arrangements neutralize the potentially 
adverse impact on fiscal deficits of  a larger degree of  proportionality of the 
electoral system. 
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